The much hyped rise of the "BRICS" (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has lately been met with equally fervent declarations of their demise. Amid slowing growth in many of these countries, the prevailing view now appears to be that the rise of the BRICS was little more than an illusion. In this article, however, I contest this assessment by arguing that the emerging powers were never solely, nor most importantly, merely an economic phenomenon. Instead, I show that emerging powers -specifically Brazil, India and China -have become an important political force in the global trading system and had a profound and lasting impact on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Contrary to the widespread assumption that these countries are too diverse to ally, I argue that the emerging powers displayed a remarkable degree of unity and cooperation, working in close concert to successfully challenge the dominance of the US and other established powers. As evidenced by the collapse of the Doha Round, the collective rise of Brazil, India and China substantially disrupted the functioning of one of the core institutions of the liberal economic order created under US hegemony.
Introduction
The rise -and, more recently, purported fall -of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has been among the most prominent stories of recent decades. The concept of the BRICS originated as a marketing tool designed by an investment bank: in 2001, a Goldman Sachs report highlighted the rapid economic growth in the BRIC countries and their increasing weight in the global economy, projecting that they would eventually overtake the established economic powers. 1 This prompted a flood of new BRICs investment funds and an explosion of interest in the BRICs. Much of the discussion to date has thus
been dominated by what could be called the Goldman Sachs view of the BRICS -as primarily an economic phenomenon, centered on rapid economic growth in these countries and resulting opportunities for investment. 2 Consequently, now that growth has slowed in many of the BRICS -with China's growth falling from double-digits to less than 7 percent, and Brazil and Russia currently in recession -the frenzy surrounding the rise of the BRICS has been replaced by equally fervent declarations of their demise. In a reversal of earlier fantastical predictions that these countries would 'power an unstoppable wave of emerging markets-led economic growth', many now conclude that slowing growth means 'the BRICs are dead'. 3 Goldman Sachs generated a fresh storm of attention when it closed its BRIC fund in 2015 after sustained losses and folded it into its larger emerging market fund. The media is replete with declarations that the BRICS are 'broken' and 'the BRIC era [has] come to an end'. 4 In short, as Michael Mandelbaum puts it, 'the darlings of the global economy' have 'fallen from grace'. Many academics have been skeptical of the BRICS concept from the start. 6 There has been considerable debate about whether the BRICS are meaningful from the perspective of international political economy, or merely a 'mirage'. 7 According to Harsh Pant, 'The narrative surrounding the rise of BRICS is as exaggerated as that of the decline of the United
States. … BRICS will remain an artificial construct -merely an acronym coined by an investment banking analyst -for quite some time to come.' 8 A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies maintains that 'the foundation of the BRICS concept is beginning to crumble' as the economic boom that buoyed these countries wanes, exacerbating the 'conflicting interests and indisputable political, social and cultural differences' that have 'kept the BRICS from translating their economic force into collective power on the global stage'. 9 Many thus dismiss the BRICS as a 'fable' or a 'fallacy' that was 'overhyped from the start'.
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In this article, however, I argue that the emerging powers were never solely, nor most importantly, a purely economic phenomenon. Equally, if not more, important has been their political impact on the governance of the global economy. In the case of the global trading system, the impact of emerging powers -specifically Brazil, India and China -has been profound. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, despite their diverse and at times conflicting interests, these three countries displayed a high degree of unity and cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. Brazil, India and China worked together in concert, and with backing from much of the developing world, to oppose the longstanding dominance of the US and other developed countries. Emerging power alliances were critical in challenging the 6 Cooper, The BRICS. 
Do the BRICS Matter?
The The purported failure of the emerging powers to exercise influence is frequently attributed to a lack of unity. Skeptics contend that, as Cynthia Roberts states, the BRICS 'are simply too diverse to achieve meaningful cooperation'. 15 Given their vast political and economic differences, the BRICS form a 'highly heterogeneous club' 16 and are in many ways 'unlikely bedfellows'. 17 Many argue that their divergent interests and mutual distrust inhibit collective action and prevent the emerging powers from acting together to challenge the dominance of established powers. 18 Tensions within this group, it is argued, still outweigh tensions between any one member and the US, hindering them from uniting to counterbalance American power. 19 The conventional wisdom is thus that the failure of the emerging powers to 'articulate a common vision' and act as a 'unified political force' has rendered them 'unable to set the global agenda and discourse'.
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The case of the WTO, however, challenges this assessment of the behavior and impact of the emerging economies. 
How Emerging Power Alliances Transformed the WTO
As this section will demonstrate, the multilateral trading system has been profoundly transformed by the emerging powers. There has been a fundamental shift in the distribution of power, propelled not by these countries acting in isolation but through mutual cooperation came to center on a confrontation between the US and the emerging powers, their informal alliance was critical in enabling China, India and Brazil to counterbalance US power.
Understanding the historical structure of power at the WTO is essential for appreciating the magnitude of the shift that has taken place. For most of its history, the multilateral trading system was dominated by the US and a handful of other developed countries. While formally agreements are reached on the basis of consensus, in practice, decision-making is heavily shaped by power. 31 The most important negotiations take place in small group meetings of key states; once agreement is reached among this core group, it is extended out to the rest of the membership, allowing a small group of states to establish the negotiating agenda and direct the negotiations. The composition of this elite group is determined informally, but it constitutes the inner-circle of power within the WTO -those states that are recognized as key players and exercise the most influence over the negotiations. Until recently, agreements were negotiated among 'the Quad' -the US, EU, Canada and Japan -and imposed upon the rest of the organization's membership effectively as a fait accompli. The rich countries carved out a trade order that suited their interests, while developing countries were excluded from decision-making and their interests marginalized.
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The launch of the Doha Round in 2001 was driven by the US and EU, over substantial opposition from developing countries. 33 While subject to coercion to compel their participation, developing countries were also promised that Doha would be a 'development' round, dedicated to redressing historical imbalances in the trading system and advancing their needs and interests. Nonetheless, at its start, the Doha Round looked much like previous rounds, with the negotiations centered on 'the Quad' and the US and EU firmly in the driver's seat. Over the course of the round, however, a significant transformation occurred. The establishment of the G20-T -a coalition of developing countries mobilized and led by Brazil and India, and backed by China -marked the critical turning point in the structure of power at the WTO. 34 At the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 -an important milestone in the Doha Round, when negotiations shifted to laying down the specific terms of the deal -Brazil and India created the G20-T to block the US-EU proposal on agriculture and demand reductions in rich country agricultural subsidies. The G20-T produced a 'tectonic shift' at the WTO, to quote one Ambassador, launching Brazil and India into the inner-circle of negotiations, as key players who were considered essential to securing a deal. 35 The G20-T became a major force in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round, with the negotiating texts directly reflecting many of its objectives.
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A second coalition centered on the emerging powers had an equally important impact on the Doha negotiations: the G33. India is the leading force behind the group, with significant support from China, and Indonesia acting as its formal coordinator. The G33 sought to limit the degree of agricultural market opening required of developing countries, advocating a 'special products' (SPs) exemption to allow developing countries to shield some products from tariff cuts and a 'special safeguard mechanism' (SSM) to allow tariff increases in response to an import surge. Despite opposition from the US and other developed countries, the G33 succeeded in securing agreement that both measures would be part of any 34 Denoted G20-Trade (G20-T) to avoid confusion with the G20 Leaders Summit. Efstathopoulos, 'Leadership in WTO'; Hopewell, Breaking the WTO; Narlikar and Tussie, 'The G20'. 35 It was the underlying alliance among the emerging powers that made the G20-T and G33 possible and turned them into a potent force at the WTO. 38 In a marked departure from the past, when developing countries had minimal influence over the shape of GATT/WTO agreements, coalitions centered on the emerging powers had a significant impact on the Doha negotiations and the content of the prospective agreement. Beyond the G20-T and G33, India mobilized developing country opposition to investment, competition and government procurement, successfully forcing those issues off the negotiating table. Brazil and India, along with South Africa, led developing countries in securing exemptions to WTO intellectual property rules for public health and access to medicines. Their opposition also prevented the US and EU from seeking expanded IP protections ('TRIPs-Plus') in the Doha
Round. In addition, Brazil, India, and South Africa were central players in the NAMA-11 coalition on manufactured goods, which secured important concessions to the defensive concerns of developing countries.
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Developing country coalitions based on the emerging powers were thus a key force in transforming power relations at the WTO. For Brazil and India, which lack the economic heft of other major powers, including China, their mobilization and leadership of coalitions was critical in enabling them to gain a seat in the inner-circle and play a significant agenda- setting role in the Doha Round. 40 Although a follower rather than a leader, these coalitions were equally important for China. Hyperbole about China's position as a 'dragon' aside, even the country seen by many as the strongest among the emerging powers required partners to negotiate shifting power dynamics at the WTO.
Even a Dragon Needs Allies
While China willingly left the leadership role to Brazil and India, it still sought the benefits and protection of developing world alliances. China was a key member of both pivotal coalitions -the G20-T and the G33 -with its economic might adding considerably to the weight of these alliances. It is our position that the greatest source of pressure on China in this round will come from the rich OECD countries. So our strategy has been to pay more attention to how our unity with developing countries could be strengthened.
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The threat of being pushed to undertake greater liberalization commitments caused China to stress its developing country status and prioritize alliances with other developing countries.
As a rival negotiator stated, 'They are aware of the risk and do everything they need to avoid it'. 44 China actively sought to build allies to strengthen its position and help guard against such threats, working to ally itself with the developing world, emphasizing its solidarity with other developing countries, and using its membership in coalitions like the G20 and G33 to pursue its interests while avoiding being singled out and targeted.
At the WTO, China cultivated the image of itself as a developing country like any other, struggling in solidarity against the rich countries. To quote a rival negotiator, China 'will always speak out for developing countries, LDCs, SVEs [small, vulnerable economies], etc., because that projects that they're supportive. But of course they're crushing these countries'. 45 Since it is in China's interest that the primary line of division be drawn between developing and developed countries, it actively worked to reinforce this structure of identities and alliances at the WTO. One negotiator explained: China is 'extremely careful with being close to the African countries and the most vulnerable countries, focusing on developing country solidarity against the industrial countries, avoiding it being put as emerging versus 43 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 44 48 China therefore sought to be treated like other developing countries and to shield itself within coalitions like the G20-T and the G33.
Alliances have thus been critical for each of the emerging powers -even China with its considerable economic might.
United by a Shared Threat
The emerging powers joined forces in the Doha Round, working in concert through the G20-T and the G33. The underlying partnership among Brazil, India and China that formed the basis for these coalitions was potentially surprising, given their divergent trade interests. Brazil, for example, is a leading agricultural exporter and defined its primary interest in the Doha Round as seeking agricultural trade liberalization to expand markets for its exports, while India and China are both resistant to liberalization, due to their large populations of peasant farmers vulnerable to import competition. Conversely, in manufactured goods, as an export powerhouse, China has a keen interest in reducing trade barriers, while Brazil and India want to protect their markets from imports. Despite their differences, the emerging powers recognized the strategic value of allying. Although not natural allies based on their trade interests, the emerging powers became allies to counter the perceived threat they faced from the established powers. 46 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 47 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 48 Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
Of particular threat to the emerging powers was the issue of 'differentiation' among developing countries. A key promise of the Doha Round was that developing countries would be granted 'special and differential treatment' (SDT), in the form of reduced liberalization commitments, greater flexibilities and exemptions, and longer implementation periods. During the round, however, the US and other advanced-industrialized states increasingly sought to restrict China, India and Brazil's access to SDT, arguing that the large emerging economies have 'graduated' from developing country status. The emerging powers staunchly maintain that they are entitled to the SDT promised to developing countries.
China, India and Brazil consider themselves developing countries and view their access to
SDT as a core part of the development commitment of the Doha Round. Indeed, for China, as one of its former negotiators stressed, 'a condition we laid down as part of our accession to the WTO was that we would join as a developing country'. 49 Thus, in the words of their negotiators, the emerging powers 'strictly oppose any talk on differentiation' and ' [Their] line is clear: SDT should apply equally to all developing countries'. 50 The threat of differentiation and being pushed to undertake greater liberalization, reducing their policy space and potentially their scope for future economic development, provided a powerful inducement for the emerging powers to ally despite their otherwise disparate interests. In other words, the emerging powers were united by a common external threat, which proved formidable enough to override their differences.
For the emerging powers, collaboration was thus less a choice than 'a compulsion', to quote one negotiator. 51 The alliance between China, India and Brazil was far from free of tension: negotiators described it as 'a very delicate embrace where you cannot leave each other' and 'a coalition of the unwilling'. 52 However, while the emerging powers, along with 49 Interview, Geneva, July 2017. 50 Interviews, Geneva, July 2017. 51 The US is still the superpower -the world's biggest economy. In a one-onone setting, the US will most always win.
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Through allying with Brazil and India, he continued, 'it is no longer one-to-one, but the US versus a group of countries. The US is the big elephant, but we now have a group of wolvesthen we have a chance'. All of the emerging powers, even China, recognized that they lacked sufficient power acting alone -making the decision to ally, as one negotiator put it, 'a clear strategic move'.
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The Price of Alliances
The importance of their alliances is signaled in the costs the emerging powers were willing to incur to construct and maintain them. Given their divergent trade interests, the alliances formed by the emerging powers required significant compromises. In the case of Brazil, for example, developing countries, particularly large and rapidly growing economies 53 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 54 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 55 Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
like China and India, represent the primary markets for its agricultural exports. Instead of pushing those countries to reduce their trade barriers, however, Brazil made a strategic decision to sacrifice its market access demands and refrain from pressing other developing countries to open their markets, in order to make its partnership with India and China possible, enable the creation of the G20-T as a unified political force, and secure support for its leadership. As one Brazilian negotiator put it, 'yes, on market access we definitely hit the brakes hard'. 56 For the sake of the G20-T and its broader alliances, Brazil showed itself willing to accept a weaker tariff reduction formula and extensive flexibilities for developing countries, which significantly reduced its potential gains in those markets. Brazil also supported India, China and the G33 on the SSM and SPs, despite the negative commercial implications for its own exporters.
Similarly, as the largest exporter of manufactured goods, China would be among the biggest beneficiaries from increased access to developing country markets, especially large emerging economies like Brazil and India, where its exports face high tariffs. Yet China was willing to accept a weaker tariff reduction formula and exemptions for developing countries, limiting their market opening at the expense of its own exports. As one negotiator stated, 'The idea that increased flexibilities are good for developing countries in general is bullshit.
Those carve-outs hurt us [competitive producers]… We'd be happier if the additional carveouts were kept in check'. 57 Nonetheless, China was willing to bear this cost for the sake of its alliances. As a Chinese negotiator explained:
We face divide and rule strategies of the developed countries. China has been adhering to this principle of unity. China could have been more aggressive in seeking market access to developing countries, but our strategy has been to show solidarity with other developing countries. Consequently, China and the other emerging powers steadfastly refrained from pressing other developing countries -including each other -for liberalization. In the words of an Indian representative, 'it doesn't make sense to pursue market access to developing countries because that's the block that's going to stand with you against the industrialized countries'.
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The emerging powers thus sacrificed the pursuit of significant export interests in order to construct and maintain their alliances.
The Established Powers Strike Back
The importance of coalitions in enhancing the power of Brazil, India and China was also evident in the concerted efforts of the traditional powers to undermine and break their alliances. The US, in particular, pursued an active 'divide and rule' strategy. The US went on the attack against the G20-T, for example, publically deriding the group and using strongarm tactics in an attempt to force it to dismantle. 60 The US threatened to withdraw from negotiations for bilateral and regional free trade agreements with several countries unless they abandoned the G20-T, which led five of the original coalition members -Columbia, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica -to drop out. Nevertheless, the G20-T was ultimately able to withstand such pressure, remain intact and replace its lost members.
The US also sought to convince poor countries that they shared common interests and countries.' 66 The US sought to isolate the large emerging economies in an effort to render them more vulnerable and extract greater concessions. But this strategy proved unsuccessful:
although developing countries willingly accepted the carrots offered by the US and other traditional powers, this failed to lessen support for the emerging powers.
Alliances Endure Despite Tensions
Given the diverse interests of developing countries, the alliances constructed by the emerging powers were not without friction. Negotiators indicate that it is easier to manage such tensions and maintain unity in the early stages of negotiations, but suppressed conflicts inevitably surface as negotiations move closer to a prospective agreement. As one stated:
'At the beginning you have very romantic and idealistic proposals that everyone is on board with, positions are very broad and it is very easy to be coordinated'. Yet as negotiations proceed toward an 'end-game' of nailing down the specific terms and provisions of the agreement, 'it becomes increasingly difficult to get a uniform position on any issue'. 67 Clear stress lines emerged within the emerging powers' coalitions at the 2008 Mini-Ministerial, when it appeared negotiations could be approaching a conclusion. At that time, many developing countries expressed dissatisfaction with the positions taken by Brazil, India and China, threatening to destabilize both the G20-T and G33.
In the G20-T, criticism of Brazil's leadership erupted from multiple sides. Until then, the group had focused on its key area of convergence -rich country agricultural subsidiesbut largely set aside the contentious question of how much developing countries should be required to open their markets, embodied in the SSM and SPs. With its membership of both importers and exporters, it was feared that trying to reach consensus on a common G20-T position would split the group apart. However, when the SSM emerged as the central issue at 66 Interview, Geneva, June 2009. 67 Similar tensions strained the unity of the G33 and support for India and China as the coalition's representatives. While India and China stood up to the US on the SSM, negotiators report that many G33 members wanted to show more flexibility. This generated resentment towards India and criticism that it was pursuing its own interests to the detriment of other G33 members. In the words of one negotiator, 'it was dog-eat-dog at that stage'.
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Tensions flared again within the G33 during the 2013 Bali Ministerial, when negotiations threatened to breakdown due to conflict between the US and India over the issue of food stockholding.
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In these pivotal moments, many coalition members feared that Brazil, India and China would simply pursue their own interests. As negotiators complained, 'no two countries are alike at the WTO' and ultimately 'every country is negotiating for their own interests'.
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Other developing countries were frustrated at being excluded from the inner-circle of negotiations and forced to rely on being represented by Brazil, India and China. The core complaint of the US was that the prospective agreement did not require enough of the large emerging economies -China, India and Brazil -who benefit from the SDT that they played a major role in securing for developing countries.
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The US therefore sought to 'rebalance' the deal by pressing the large emerging economies to undertake greater liberalization. 80 Its efforts centered on pressing these countries to participate in 'sectorals' (aggressive liberalization in specific industrial sectors to reduce tariffs to zero) in two key areas of US competitive advantage -chemicals and industrial machinery. Sectorals were effectively an add-on to the core agreement, pushed by the US as a means to extract additional market opening from the large emerging economies.
In addition, the US pressed the emerging economies to commit to not using their SP exemptions in agriculture against specific products of export interest to the US (such as cotton, wheat and corn), in order to guarantee the US market access gains in those areas.
In effect, as the US was increasingly pressed to liberalize its market in the Doha Round, it responded by ratcheting up its demands for concessions from the emerging powers.
China, India and Brazil, however, viewed the US's heightened demands as unfair and unjustified. 81 The emerging powers emphasized that the Doha 'Development' Round had promised to deliver meaningful gains to the developing world. A core aspect of the Doha mandate was the principle that developing countries, including China, India and Brazil,
would not be required to engage in an equal exchange of concessions with the advancedindustrialized states, but instead that the final agreement would be reached on the basis of 'less than full reciprocity' in favor of developing countries. From the perspective of the emerging powers, the US was now trying to change the terms of the deal by seeking less than full reciprocity in its own favor, in clear violation of the development mandate of the round. After years of repeated breakdown, the Doha Round reached a permanent impasse in 2008. The Ministerial ostensibly broke down due to a skirmish between the US, on one hand, and India and China, on the other, over the SSM. However, the deeper source of conflict was the US's desire to 'rebalance' the deal by securing greater access for its agriculture and manufactured goods to the markets of the large emerging economies, particularly China.
With the old and new powers unable to reach agreement, the negotiations became deadlocked. As the WTO Director-General acknowledged, at the core of the Doha stalemate was a dispute over 'the balance in contributions and responsibilities between emerging and advanced economies'. 82 In short, the SDT extended to the emerging powers in the draft texts of the proposed Doha agreement made the agreement untenable to the US. The US has refused to commit to liberalization in the Doha Round unless greater liberalization is required of the major emerging economies. Yet the emerging powers argue that, as developing countries, they are entitled to SDT and should not be required to make further concessions to appease the US. With these two sides relatively evenly matched, neither was able to overpower and impose its will upon the other. Ministerial, states reached agreement on trade facilitation, food stockholding, and select issues related to SDT for LDCs. 84 However, even that limited package proved highly contentious and its enactment was nearly derailed by persistent conflict between the US and India over food stockholding. 85 The supported India and China on both issues. As a Brazilian negotiator stated: 'we have our own interests, but we see these as legitimate issues for China and India, so overall we've been supportive of what they are seeking to achieve'. 88 He frankly acknowledged that Brazil's motives are strategic: 'We're trying to navigate without creating problems with China and India. The issue that continues to unite us is graduation, so we're still close allies. We try to manage this carefully -confrontation between us would not be good.' Another negotiator echoed this:
We have two overriding common concerns -development and SDT. When it comes to SDT, we remain united on not having that core principle undermined. Whenever there is an attack on the development component of the round, there is a strong sense of solidarity, a reaction of sticking together.
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The emerging powers are acutely aware that they remain prime targets of the US, and this external threat -of being forced to accept differentiation and denied access to special and differential treatment -continues to knit them together. In order to guard against the perpetual risk of being overpowered by the US, the emerging powers thus, as one representative put it, 'still try as much as possible to stay as one.' 90 Consequently, while tensions among the emerging powers were exacerbated by frustration at the breakdown of 88 Interview, Geneva, July 2016. 89 Interview, Geneva, July 2017. 90 Interview, Geneva, July 2017.
round, as one negotiator summed up, 'It's not exactly love and harmony, but it's certainly not open dissent either'. 91 The strategic alignment among the emerging powers that characterized the Doha Round has proven durable and enduring.
Conclusion
An analysis of power shifts at the WTO challenges the increasingly prevalent view that the rise of the BRICS was merely an illusion or a fallacy, hyped by market actors to sell 
